EXHIBIT G

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BENJAMIN GROSS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs,

V.

GFI GROUP, INC., COLIN HEFFRON, and MICHAEL GOOCH,

Defendants.

Case No.: 1:14-CV-09438-WHP

VIDEO DEPOSITION OF

Chad Coffman

September 27, 2017

New York, New York

Lead: John Lynch, Esquire

Firm: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz

FINAL COPY - CONFIDENTIAL

JANE ROSE REPORTING 1-800-825-3341

JANE ROSE REPORTING 1-800-825-3341

National Court-Reporting Coverage janerose@janerosereporting.com

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 49 1 Do you recognize this as the press Q. 2 release that's at issue in this litigation? 3 (Witness reviewing document). Α. This is my understanding of 4 Yes. 5 the press release that contains what 6 plaintiffs allege is the false and misleading 7 statement by Mr. Gooch -- or by the company. 8 Have you ever seen it before today? Ο. 9 Α. Yes. 10 Why don't we take a look at --0. while you have that in front of you, let me 11 12 just ask you. If we take a look at paragraph 20 of your opening report --13 14 Α. Okay. 15 Q. -- the first sentence of paragraph 16 20 says, "According to the complaint, this 17 deal was not a singular and unique 18 opportunity to return value and did not 19 maximize shareholder value as stated by 20 defendants." 21 Now, let me ask you, is it your 22 understanding that defendants stated that 23 this transaction maximized shareholder value, 24 or is that just an allusion to something 25 that's been alleged by the plaintiffs?

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 50 1 That's something that I read 2 from the statement as well. So in my reading of the statement, I understand the company and Mr. Gooch to be saying that they have 4 5 optimized value for shareholders. 6 That's not what this says, though, Q. 7 right? 8 Well, no. It says -- let me read Α. 9 the quote. It says, "We are very pleased to 10 announce this transaction with CME Group and 11 the substantial premium and liquidity it 12 delivers to our stockholders. Optimizing 13 GFI's value" -- which to me implies 14 maximizing value for stock -- it says, 15 "optimizing GFI's value for stockholders" --16 which I read as maximizing the attainable value for stockholders -- "has been a goal of 17 18 management since becoming a public company in 19 2005, and this transaction represents a singular and unique opportunity to return 20 21 value." 22 So I am reading this as saying we 23 have accomplished our goal of optimizing GFI's value for stockholders. 24 25 It doesn't say that, doesn't it? Q.

JANE ROSE REPORTING 1-800-825-3341

National Court-Reporting Coverage janerose@janerosereporting.com

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 75 1 optimization of shareholder value because 2 there was clear evidence that there was 3 another bidder willing to offer more and the 4 management consortium itself was willing to 5 offer more than they did as part of the 6 original proposal, right? That's your 7 testimony? 8 Α. Yes. Yes. 9 Do you have any evidence at all 10 that there was another willing bidder willing to offer more for GFI than \$4.55 a share on 11 12 July 30th, 2014? 13 Α. You mean prior to the announcement 14 of the CME offer? 15 I mean on July 30th, 2014. 0. 16 prior to the announcement of the CME offer --17 thank you -- on July 30th, 2014. 18 THE WITNESS: Could I have that 19 read back, please. 20 BY MR. LYNCH: 21 I will ask it again. Q. 22 Α. Okay. 23 I think your clarification was 24 helpful. I am asking about the date of July 25 30th, but I am asking about the period of

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 76

1 July 30 before the press release was 2 announced. 3 (Nodding affirmatively). Α. Do you have any evidence at all 4 Q. 5 that there was another willing bidder willing 6 to offer more for GFI than \$4.55 a share at 7 that time? 8 Α. I'm not aware of any direct 9 evidence that before the press release on 10 July 30th that there was someone willing, 11 independent of -- to offer more than \$4.55. 12 I think that's fair. I am not aware of any evidence suggesting that somebody was ready 14 and willing and able to bid more than \$4.55 15 prior to July 30th. 16 Do you have any indirect evidence 17 of that? 18 Well, my understanding of what --19 of the reason that BGC was ultimately 20 offering more was that they had gained an 21 understanding from the July 30th announcement 22 how much a third party was willing to pay for 23 the Trayport and Fenics portion of GFI's 24 business. And then once that was known, that 25 they would have been willing to bid more as a

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 78 1 consortium wanted to bid more than what they 2 bid as of July 30th, but certainly they were 3 willing -- later actions showed that they were willing to bid more than what was 4 5 offered in the original CME deal. 6 I think you foresaw where my next 0. 7 question was going. 8 Do you have any evidence at all to 9 suggest that the management consortium was 10 willing to pay more as of the time of the 11 press release on July 30th for the 12 inter-dealer broker business than the amount 13 that it had agreed to pay in the deal with 14 CME? 15 Α. I am not aware of any 16 contemporaneous evidence as of July 30 of 17 that. But I think the fact that they were 18 willing to bid substantially more and what I 19 understand is, roughly, double the amount for 20 the IDB assets once competition was 21 introduced into the process, that that 22 implies that they were willing to pay more if 23 forced as of -- there is no reason that -- in 24 other words, to answer your question 25 directly, I am not aware of any

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 79 1 contemporaneous evidence suggesting that the 2 management consortium wanted to or was 3 willing to bid more than what they did as of 4 July 30th, but later actions suggested they 5 valued the assets much more highly than what 6 the CME deal reflected. 7 Any evidence that you are aware of 8 that suggests that the management consortium, 9 whether they wanted to or not, were willing 10 to pay -- sorry. I will start again. 11 Do you have any evidence at all 12 that the management consortium as of the time 13 of the press release, whether they were 14 willing to or not, had the ability to pay 1.5 more for the inter-dealer broker business 16 than they had agreed to pay in the 17 transaction with CME? 18 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 19 Now, when you say ability, are you -- I understand that their -- and I don't 20 21 have deep knowledge of this, but my general 22 understanding is that they were making offers 23 based on financing that had been arranged in 24 order to be able to make those offers, and so 25 I am not aware that financing to support a

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 98 1 literature itself. What I have is a -- what 2 I have a problem with is saying that it's 3 applicable and to think of that as evidence 4 for what you would expect to see when a 5 proposed deal substantially undervalues the 6 assets at issue, as the plaintiffs are 7 alleging here. So its applicability, not the 8 findings of the literature itself. Its 9 applicability to the facts in this case. 10 BY MR. LYNCH: 11 0. And I guess the reason you reached 12 that conclusion is because you are accepting 13 the plaintiffs' allegations concerning the 14 truth or falsity of the July 30 press 15 release, right? 16 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 17 I am accepting plaintiffs' 18 allegation that this was a false and 19 misleading statement and that this deal did 20 not optimize the value for shareholders, and 21 defendants understood that this -- they had 22 concealed from the market facts that made 23 that statement false and misleading. BY MR. LYNCH: 24 25 0. And just so we are clear, do you

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 101 1 evaluated. 2 BY MR. LYNCH: 3 Would you agree that providing GFI shareholders with CME stock at a premium 4 5 price to the then current trading value in 6 connection with the sale of Trayport and 7 Fenics to CME was a way to return value to 8 GFI shareholders? 9 Α. That was a way to return value to 10 shareholders, yes. 11 Would you agree that it was a 0. 12 unique way to return value to shareholders? 13 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 14 Α. I guess it depends on what you mean 15 by "unique." Is it the only way you could, 16 in that sense is it unique? No. Is every 17 potential alternative transaction unique in 18 the sense they are different? Yes. 19 guess it depends how you are using the word 20 "unique" there. 21 BY MR. LYNCH:

Ο.

22

23

24

25

In your understanding of the word

unique, was a deal in which GFI shareholders

received CME stock at a premium price to the

then current trading value in connection with

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 102 1 the sale of Trayport and Fenics, the unique 2 way to return value in the way that you use 3 the word "unique"? 4 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 5 I am very confused on where I use 6 the word "unique" in the way you are 7 suggesting. Maybe I am just lost in your 8 question. 9 BY MR. LYNCH: 10 You understand English, right? Q. 11 Α. Yes. 12 And I don't mean to be offensive. 13 You are a native English speaker? 14 Α. Yes. 15 You have used the word "unique" in Q. 16 the past, right? 17 Α. I have, yes. 18 Would you agree that a transaction 19 in which GFI shareholders would receive CME 20 stock at a premium price to the then current 21 trading value in connection with a sale of 22 Trayport and Fenics to CME was a unique way 23 to return value? 24 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 25 Again, I think I have been -- you Α.

JANE ROSE REPORTING 1-800-825-3341

National Court-Reporting Coverage janerose@janerosereporting.com

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 103

- are not asking me to interpret the word
- "unique" in a misstatement at this point.
- 3 You are asking me a general question of is
- 4 that a unique way to return value, and I am
- saying in the sense of the word "unique," is
- it the only way value could have been
- 7 returned? No. Is it unique in the sense
- 8 that every single deal -- alternative deal is
- 9 somewhat different from each other, in that
- sense, it's a unique deal.
- So it depends on the context of the
- use of the word "unique." So that's why it's
- hard to give just a plain yes-or-no answer
- and given that there was the use of the word
- "unique" in the alleged misstatement, I don't
- want it to be interpreted one way in one
- 17 context and another way in my separate answer
- to this question.
- 19 BY MR. LYNCH:
- Q. And that's because you think it
- 21 means two different things according to which
- 22 sentence it's used in?
- A. Words can have different meaning
- depending on the context they are used in,
- 25 yes.

1

2

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 104

- Q. You agree that every alternative transaction is unique, right?
- MR. ROTTER: Objection.
- ⁴ A. In some sense, every transaction is
- 5 unique, yes. When you are talking about
- 6 alternative transactions of the types we are
- ⁷ talking about. If you are talking about
- 8 trading commodities, you might be able to say
- 9 different transactions are essentially
- 10 identical. But in the case of sales of
- businesses to third parties, each alternative
- transaction is, in some sense, unique, yes.
- 13 That's I think self evident.
- 14 BY MR. LYNCH:
- Q. Would you agree that providing GFI
- shareholders with CME stock at a premium in
- connection with the sale of Trayport and
- 18 Fenics was a singular way to return value to
- 19 GFI shareholders?
- MR. ROTTER: Objection.
- A. Again, I think I would answer the
- 22 same way. If singular is meant -- is it the
- only way one could, the answer is no. If
- singular is interpreted as meaning is this
- deal not identical to an alternative deal,

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 105 1 then, yes. 2 BY MR. LYNCH: 3 Let's take a look back at the press Ο. 4 release, Exhibit 13, please. 5 Do you have that in front of you? 6 I do, yes. Α. 7 I am going to ask you about the Q. 8 first page. 9 The first page? Α. 10 The first page under "For Immediate 0. 11 Release," not the SEC stuff. The headline 12 there says, "CME Group and GFI Group Announce 13 Plan for Strategic Transactions," right? 14 Do you see that? 15 Α. Yes. 16 0. It was an accurate statement, as 17 far as you know, right? 18 Yes. And there was something that Α. 19 bothered me about your prior question that I 20 just want to go back to that I want to make 21 sure I am not implicitly agreeing to. You 22 characterized the transaction as the sale of 23 Trayport and Fenics to CME, and that's 24 certainly part of the deal, but there is more 25 to it than that. There is also the

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 106 1 management consortium taking control of the 2 IDB business. 3 So I just want to make sure that I 4 am not characterizing the transaction as 5 solely limited to the sale of Trayport 6 defendants. 0. I appreciate that. Thank you. 8 Would you agree that providing GFI 9 shareholders with CME stock at a premium was a singular way to return value? 10 11 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 12 Again, I will give the same answer 13 I gave before. If you are interpreting 14 singular to mean the only possible way to 15 return value, the answer is no. If you are 16 interpreting singular to mean it's 17 distinguishable from other potential deals 18 and no other deal would be identical to that, 19 then yes. 20 BY MR. LYNCH: 21 You are aware it was a 46 percent 22 premium to the then current trading price, 23 right, for GFI, the CME deal when announced? I don't recall if I calculated it 24 25 myself, but I recall seeing reference to

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 117 1 I don't know exactly what was in 2 their mind, but the fact that they did the deal, to an economist, that would suggest 4 they thought it was a profitable deal, yes. 5 BY MR. LYNCH: 6 And the "they" there is the CME 0. 7 just for the record? 8 Α. The CME, yes. 9 And a reasonable investor would 10 infer that CME thought it was a good deal, 11 right? 12 A reasonable investor would infer 13 that CME sought to profit from it, yes, and 14 believed it was a deal that they could profit 15 from. 16 0. Believed it was an advantageous 17 price from CME's perspective, right? 18 Again, I just want to make sure Α. 19 advantageous is not over interpreted. 20 were going to derive at least as much value, 21 if not more, from acquiring the asset at that 22 price, and so it was in their economic 23 advantage to do it, yes. 24 As an economist, you would agree 25 that readers of the press release would be

able to infer as of July 30th that the

US District Court - New York Gross v. GFI Group

1

1920

21

22

23

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 118

2 management consortium, Mr. Gooch and 3 Mr. Heffron and others, considered the price 4 that they were paying for the IDB business to 5 be favorable, right? 6 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 7 That's a complicated question 8 because they are on both sides of the 9 I think it's fair to say no transaction. 10 reader of this thought that they were taking 11 the business at a loss. But given what I 12 understand are other obligations of 13 management of a company to stand in the 14 interests of shareholders, I think where the 15 deal ultimately fell in terms of distribution 16 of benefits between shareholders and the 17 management consortium is -- it's not 18 clear one could infer anything specifically

shareholders and the management consortium.

from this other than that they wouldn't pay

more than it was worth, but it's an open

question of whether they were paying up to

the amount it was worth or whether the -- how

the benefits of the deal were spread between

25 So, in other words, you could hypothesize a

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 119 1 deal where the management consortium is 2 essentially paying the reservation price, 3 which is the highest they would go and what 4 the fair value of the asset was and giving 5 essentially all the benefit of the 6 transaction to the shareholders. It could 7 also go the other way. So I don't think you 8 could infer from this directly that they 9 viewed -- they certainly wouldn't have done 10 it at a loss, but there is enough conflicting 11 incentives here that it's not clear how much 12 private benefit a reader of this would assume 13 that the management consortium was getting. 14 And that's because of obligations 15 that you think that they owed to shareholders 16 of GFI in their capacity as private buyers of 17 the management consortium -- sorry, private 18 buyers of the IDB? Do I understand that 19 right? 20 I think you are misstating 21 what I am saying, because I am not saying 22 that as buyers of the IDB business that they 23 have -- in that role alone, I don't think 24 they have any obligation to GFI shareholders. 25 In other words, if they were an unrelated

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 120

- third party, the fact that they were buying
- wouldn't create an obligation on their part
- 3 to do anything other than try to do the best
- 4 deal they can.

5

- Q. For themselves, right?
- A. For themselves, correct. But I'm
- saying a reader of this press release also
- understands that in his role as CEO and other
- 9 management also has some level of duty to the
- shareholders. And I am not a lawyer who
- understands exactly what all those things
- 12 are, but my understanding is they also have
- 13 conflicting duties to their shareholders as
- management in GFI. And so a reader of this
- press release might question to what extent
- they are benefiting privately versus
- benefiting the shareholders.
- Q. A reader of the press release would
- understand that the special committee is
- 20 created in most circumstances to address the
- 21 possibility of a conflict of interest between
- insiders who stand on both sides of a
- 23 transaction, right?
- MR. ROTTER: Objection.
- A. Again, I am not a lawyer, but

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 121

- that's my general understanding of how this
- is supposed to work, yes, is that there is
- 3 supposed to be an independent committee whose
- 4 sole focus is trying to represent the
- 5 interests of the shareholders.
- 6 BY MR. LYNCH:
- Q. And a reader of the press release
- 8 would see that there was a special committee
- 9 involved in the negotiation of the CME deal
- 10 for GFI, right? If it will help, I am happy
- 11 to point -- there is a paragraph just below
- 12 the two bullet points that we have been
- discussing.
- 14 A. Yes. There is another place, too.
- 15 That's why I am -- yes, it makes reference to
- a special committee, which a reader of this
- would then, I think, be entitled to infer
- that there was a special committee process
- 19 here.
- O. And so a reasonable reader of the
- 21 press release would understand that, as
- 22 buyers of the IDB business in the two-step
- transaction with the CME Group, that the
- members of the management consortium
- considered the price that they were paying

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 122 1 for the IDB business to be favorable, right? 2 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 3 THE WITNESS: Could I have that 4 read back, please. 5 (Ouestion read) 6 I think the reader could infer that 7 they thought this was a good deal for them, 8 yes. A favorable deal. 9 BY MR. LYNCH: 10 And a reasonable reader could infer 0. that the management consortium expected to 11 12 derive a profit on the deal, right, or as a 13 result of doing the deal? Put it that way. 14 I think that would be a fair 15 reading, yes. 16 Let's go to paragraph 6 of your 17 opening report, please. Please read as much 18 of it as you need, but I am going to ask you 19 about the last sentence of paragraph 6. 20 carries over onto the top of page 3. 21 Α. Okay. 22 It says, "When the board and Q. 23 Greenhill & Company ('Greenhill'), an 24 investment bank hired to advise the GFI 25 special committee, tried to find a better

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 141 1 that. 2 In your earlier answer -- let me 3 make sure I have the length of time covered. 4 You would agree that during the class period 5 that multiple potential acquirers had an 6 opportunity to bid on GFI, right? 7 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 8 Α. So during the class period, there is nothing, in theory, preventing a third 9 10 party from coming in and putting in a tender 11 offer or bidding for the company. I think 12 that's a fair statement. I don't think there 13 was a process at that point seeking out 14 additional or alternative bids, as far as I 15 know, but if you are saying was there 16 anything I am aware of that precludes 17 somebody from throwing in an offer, I don't 18 believe there was. 19 BY MR. LYNCH: 20 As an economist, you would agree 21 that an announcement of a merger agreement at 22 a -- an announcement of a merger agreement at 23 a particular price has the effect of 24 attracting interest in the target company by 25 other potential acquirers, right?

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 142 1 I would say it has the potential to 2 do that, sure. 3 It eliminates some of the Ο. 4 uncertainty that potential acquirers might 5 otherwise have confronted in considering an 6 acquisition of the target company, right? 7 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 8 Α. Certain types of uncertainty, sure. 9 BY MR. LYNCH: 10 It has the effect of clarifying the 0. 11 value of the target company for potential 12 acquirers, right? 13 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 14 Α. It could potentially do that, yes. 15 Well, let me -- I will leave it at 16 that. 17 BY MR. LYNCH: 18 Let's take a look again at the July 19 30 press release and the statement that's 20 attributed -- you can read as much of it as 21 I am mostly focused on the one you like. 22 sentence that plaintiffs are alleging was 23 false. 24 Α. Okay. 25 So we are focusing on the Q.

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 143 1 optimizing sentence, right? You have it in 2 front of you? 3 Α. Yes. 4 0. In your view, does that optimizing 5 sentence communicate to reasonable investors 6 anything about how proactive the GFI board 7 was in pursuing a competitive bidding 8 process? 9 It doesn't provide any information Α. 10 specifically on that, no. 11 0. Whether it provides information 12 specifically or not, did it communicate to 13 reasonable readers of the press release 14 anything about how proactive the -- a 15 competitive bidding process had been in in 16 the lead up to the entry into the CME deal? 17 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 18 I don't think it said -- you could 19 read into it any specificity about the 20 proactiveness of any particular party, 21 including the special committee, other than 22 that -- other than what Mr. Gooch was telling 23 shareholders is that whatever the process 24 was, it optimized GFI's value. 25 MR. LYNCH: I think we will take a

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 147

```
1
    announcement, partially revealing the
2
    relevant truth that had been concealed by the
3
    alleged misrepresentations and/or omissions."
4
                Why do you believe that BGC's
5
    intent to acquire GFI partially revealed the
6
    relevant truth that had been concealed by the
7
    alleged misrepresentations and/or omissions?
8
                Because plaintiffs allege that
9
    defendants misrepresented the CME deal as
10
    having optimized value and omitted to
11
    disclose the underlying facts that made that
12
    misstatement -- alleged misstatement false
13
    and misleading, and the economic import of
14
    those misstatements was that it conveyed to
15
    the market that 4.55 was an optimized value
16
    and this was a bidder coming in. So BGC's
17
    intent to acquire GFI at a much higher value,
18
    if plaintiffs' allegations are correct,
19
    provided the market the information it needed
20
    to more properly value GFI common stock.
21
                You are not aware of any evidence
22
    that BGC had any intent to acquire GFI at any
23
    value higher than 4.55 as of the time that
24
    the press release was announced on July 30th,
25
    right?
```

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 148 1 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 2 I am not aware of any evidence Α. 3 specifically suggesting that BGC intended 4 to offer more than 4.55 before it learned 5 more about the underlying value of Trayport 6 and Fenics that was contained in the 7 September -- I'm sorry, the July 30th press 8 release. 9 BY MR. LYNCH: 10 And you have read Mr. Lutnick's 11 testimony, right? 12 I don't know if I have read all of 13 his testimony, but I have certainly read 14 parts of his testimony, yes. 15 You read the part of his testimony 16 where he testified, in effect, that he was 17 not willing to bid more than -- anything more 18 than \$4.55 until he learned what CME had 19 agreed to pay for GFI, right? 20 MR. ROTTER: Objection to the 21 mischaracterization of Mr. Lutnick's 22 testimony. 23 BY MR. LYNCH: 24 Do you believe that 25 mischaracterizes Mr. Lutnick's testimony?

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 167 1 I am sorry. Maybe I didn't focus 2 on your question carefully enough, so can we 3 go back and either reread or restate the question to me because I realize now you are 4 5 asking me about what was in the text of the 6 article. 7 Ο. Yes. 8 Α. And I sort of lost the rest --9 The text of the article is one of 10 the things that you use as support for your 11 view that September 8th and 9th were a 12 corrective event, right? 13 Yes. Because there is specific new Α. 14 information the market is learning on that 15 date that was conveyed in this article. 16 0. But nothing in the article 17 suggested that BGC was willing to pay more 18 than -- had any information available to it 19 that would have made it willing to pay more 20 for GFI than CME, right? 21 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 22 MR. LYNCH: Thank you, Josh. 23 BY MR. LYNCH: 24 Nothing in the article suggested 25 that BGC as of the time that the CME deal was

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 168 1 announced had information available to it 2 that would have persuaded it that it was 3 willing to pay more than CME for GFI, right? 4 Α. There is nothing in the text of the 5 article that's that specific of allowing one 6 to draw the conclusion that he was willing to 7 pay more as of July 30th based on pre-July 8 30th information, that's correct. 9 10 (Exhibit 126, Form 8-K filed by BGC 11 Partners with attached press release 12 dated September 9, 2014, was marked for 13 identification) 14 15 BY MR. LYNCH: 16 Let's take a look at Exhibit 126, 0. 17 and this is a Form 8-K filed by BGC Partners. 18 It's previously marked as Exhibit 126. 19 attaches a press release dated September 9, 20 2014. 21 I'm sorry. Before we do that, I 22 should follow up with one -- a couple of 23 questions on The Wall Street Journal news 24 story. I asked you where in the article it 25 provides -- I think I asked you, anyway -- it

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 178 1 significant discount agreed to with respect 2 to the purchase of the brokerage and the 3 clearing business, we intend to make an offer 4 directly to the GFI shareholders." 5 It then reiterates what was said in 6 the press release about the premium that was 7 being offered and also focuses on the ability 8 to provide immediate, certain and compelling 9 value without material contingencies. 10 A statement that "Without material 11 contingencies and at a significant all-cash 12 premium to the pending transaction, we 13 believe that our offer constitutes a superior 14 proposal to the pending transaction and that 15 your shareholders will find our offer 16 extremely compelling." 17 (Witness reviewing document) 18 I think that reflects what, in my 19 view, is the portions of this that are 20 corrective in nature. 21 What does any of that reveal about 22 the -- about what you call the relevant 23 economic truth about defendants' attempts to 24 prevent a competitive bidding process in the 25 lead up to the announcement of the CME deal?

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 179

```
1
                Again, my understanding of
2
    plaintiffs' allegations are that Mr. Gooch
3
    had made a statement and the company had made
4
    a statement suggesting that the deal -- the
5
    CME deal optimized shareholder value when, in
6
    fact, they allege that the process for
7
    arriving at that value was flawed in a number
8
    of ways, including that the process was
9
    steered to exclude competitive bidding, that
10
    the defendants interfered with the special
11
    committee's attempt to do a market check and
12
    that the previous overtures by BGC had not
13
    been sufficiently explored and, therefore,
14
    the deal price that was agreed to, as an
15
    economic matter, undervalued the assets and
16
    in reliance on -- and the market's reliance
17
    on Mr. Gooch's statement and the market price
18
    that prevailed as a result of those
19
    statements did not reflect the true
20
    underlying value of the assets that would
21
    have been -- that those assets had, and so
22
    what the economic information that was
23
    concealed from the market was the true
24
    underlying value of those assets and how that
    had been -- and that that had been concealed
25
```

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 180 1 from the market by the failure -- as a result 2 of the alleged misstatement. 3 So when BGC comes in and states 4 that the value of the underlying assets is 5 higher, offers to bid for those assets and 6 directly states that they view the price 7 that's contemplated by the CME deal as 8 containing a discount on the value of the IDB 9 assets, that that's providing corrective 10 information to the market that dispelled the 11 prior view given by Mr. Gooch that the 4.55 12 optimized shareholder value. 13 But you have defined corrective 14 disclosure as something that reveals the 15 relevant economic truth about an attempt to 16 prevent a competitive bidding process, and 17 what it sounds like you just described 18 instead is information that you think 19 revealed some truth about value, right? 20 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 21 Well, I don't think those two are Α. 22 mutually exclusive. I think what I am saying 23 is the entire nature of plaintiffs' claim is 24 that they engaged -- there was a statement

made to the market by the company and Gooch

25

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 192 1 exclusive. 2 Do you agree that BGC's 3 announcement of a \$5.25 offer on September 4 9th had a causal effect on the combined price 5 increase in GFI stock on September 8th and 6 9th? 7 Α. When you use the word "combined" in 8 that question, are you referring to the two 9 days? I just want to make sure. 10 Q. I will ask it a different way. 11 Thank you. 12 Do you agree that BGC's 13 announcement of a \$5.25 per share offer on 14 September 9th had a causal effect on the 15 price increase in GFI stock on September 9th? 16 Α. Yes. 17 What evidence can you point to to 18 suggest that BGC was prepared to bid \$5.25 19 per share on July 30th? 20 I think the -- again, I think we Α. 21 have talked about this several times. 22 not suggesting that there is any specific 23 evidence to suggest that they had all the 24 information in order to be able to convey 25 that offer for GFI as a whole on -- or prior

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 193 1 to the CME deal being disclosed. That's not 2 to say they wouldn't have. I don't know if 3 they would or wouldn't have. I am not aware 4 of any specific evidence. But what I 5 understand plaintiffs' claim is, is that it's 6 the flawed process of getting to the CME deal 7 that failed to reveal the true value of the 8 underlying assets and that Mr. Gooch's 9 statement was -- that that optimized value 10 was false and misleading. And the GFI offer 11 is information that corrected that impression 12 that was in the market. 13 And was the \$5.25 offer by BGC on 14 September 9th material to GFI shareholders at 15 that time, on September 9th? 16 Α. Yes. 17 Have you made any attempt to 18 calculate -- you have calculated there is 19 \$1.13 price difference that's created on 20 September -- over the course of September 8th 21 and September 9th? 22 Α. I guess the way I would say it is 23 after controlling for -- or what I controlled 24 for, there was an unexpected price movement 25 of \$1.13 on those -- combined on those two

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 194 1 days. 2 Fair enough. Thank you. Q. 3 Have you made any attempt to 4 calculate how much of that \$1.13 unexpected 5 price movement was attributable to the \$5.25 6 offer that BGC made on September 9th? 7 Objection. MR. ROTTER: 8 Α. Well, I think that's the primary 9 motivating factor. And also how that -- the 10 arrival of that offer also revealed that -- a 11 greater chance of a more competitive bidding 12 process to ensue because the stock price 13 actually rose above the \$5.25 offer. 14 think -- but I attribute the movement in the 15 price to the offer and the markets 16 understanding that there might be continued 17 bidding after that. 18 BY MR. LYNCH: 19 Is it your opinion that if 20 plaintiffs' allegations were -- are -- strike 21 that. 22 Is it your opinion that if a 23 competitive bidding process had been allowed 24 to proceed in sort of the view of plaintiffs' 25 take on this case, that a \$5.25 offer from

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 195

- 1 BGC would have occurred at any time before 2 the announcement of the CME deal? 3 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 4 Α. I think that's plausible, but I 5 don't think that's a specific opinion that I 6 am offering would have been the outcome. 7 BY MR. LYNCH: 8 And if it hadn't -- if there had Ο. 9 been no \$5.25 offer from BGC for GFI shares 10 as of July 30th, then there is no way that 11 GFI could have announced the \$5.25 offer from 12 BGC on July 30th, right? 13 Α. That's fair, yes. 14 Ο. Is there any other time during the 15 class period that you are aware that GFI 16 could have announced that BGC was prepared to 17 bid \$5.25 per share for GFI shares? 18 I am not aware of anytime before Α. 19 September 9th that GFI was specifically aware 20 of the \$5.25 offer, so I don't think they 21 could have disclosed that prior to that date. 22 Again, I don't think that's the relevant 23 question, but I don't think they could have 24 disclosed that specific thing, no.
- JANE ROSE REPORTING 1-800-825-3341

Q.

25

Is it your opinion that had BGC

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 201

- been the result earlier, prior to July 30th,
- I am not certain. That's really not the
- question I was asked to evaluate.
- 4 BY MR. LYNCH:

5

6

7

8

13

17

18

- Q. Do you agree that BGC's purchase of GFI shares on September 8th had anything to do with the increase in the GFI stock price that occurred on September 8, 2014?
- 9 A. I just -- I want to make sure that
 10 I understand your question. So you are
 11 talking about BGC's open market purchases of
 12 GFI shares?
 - Q. Correct, their qualification.
- A. Do I believe that influenced the market price on September 8th? I believe it could have, yes.
 - Q. Do you have a view one way or the other?
- A. I think between Professor Jarrell and I, we have identified two potential
- 21 movements -- two potential underlying causal
- factors that could have caused the movement
- on September 8th: BGC purchasing shares in
- the open market to further establish their
- total and position; and the potential leakage

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 202 1 of information about the offer itself into 2 the market. 3 I think either one of those -- and I am clear in my report about -- in my 4 5 rebuttal report about this -- either one of 6 those reflects the market's updated 7 understanding about what people are willing 8 to pay for GFI shares. Therefore, it doesn't 9 matter to me which of those two explanations 10 is right. It could be one. It could be the 11 It could be a combination of the two. 12 But for my opinions, it doesn't matter. 13 As far as you are concerned, the 14 price increase on September 8th, excluding 15 general market effects, was caused by either 16 BGC's purchase of shares or the leakage of 17 news of a possible topping bid for GFI, 18 right? 19 Or some combination of those two, 20 yes. 21 Anything else, apart from general 22 market effects, that might have contributed 23 to the stock price increase on September 8th? 24 I am not aware of any information Α. 25 that, in my view, would have caused that

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

iuse 7

- than the total position, but again, because
- 2 it was unnecessary for the purpose of my
- opinion to separate between the two, I
- 4 haven't formed a definitive view as to which
- it was other than that the combination of the
- 6 two clearly was material to investors.
- Q. GFI's open market -- sorry. BGC's open market purchases of GFI shares on September 8th, 2014 could not have been
- announced on July 30th, right?
- 11 A. That's correct.
- Q. And leakage of BGC's willingness to
- pay 5.25 -- or leakage of BGC's willingness
- to make a topping bid for GFI, if there was
- any such leakage, that also could not have
- happened on July 30th, right?
 MR. ROTTER: Objection.
- 18 A T think that would deper
- A. I think that would depend on when exactly BGC had made the decision that it was
- going to or was likely to make that topping
- bid, but I don't have any evidence to suggest
- that they had made that decision as of July
- ²³ 30th.
- 24 BY MR. LYNCH:
- Q. So that's July 30th. Was there any

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

- other time in the class period at any time
- before September 8th that GFI could have
- disclosed purchases of GFI shares by BGC on
- 4 the open market on September 8th?
- 5 A. No. If you are talking about the
- 6 actual purchases of BGC shares on September
- ⁷ 8th, no.
- Q. Are you aware of any basis that GFI
- had to disclose at any time during the class
- 10 period that it expected GFI to make a topping
- 11 **bid?**
- MR. ROTTER: Objection.
- 13 A. No.
- 14 BY MR. LYNCH:
- Q. We took a look at Exhibit 126 --
- MR. ROTTER: That last question, do
- you want to just read it to yourself.
- 18 BY MR. LYNCH:
- Q. Are you aware of any basis -- thank
- you very much, Mr. Rotter.
- Do you have any basis, Mr. Coffman,
- 22 to believe that GFI -- strike that.
- 23 Are you aware of any basis that GFI
- had at any time during the class period to
- disclose that it expected BGC to make a

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 207 1 topping bid? 2 I am sorry. Could I have that read 3 back? I want to make sure I got it right. (Question read) 4 5 I am not aware of anything that 6 suggests that. 7 BY MR. LYNCH: 8 You understand BGC announced on 9 September 9th that it had accumulated a 13.5 10 percent toe hold in GFI, right? 11 I believe that's right. I just 12 want to verify the number, but I believe 13 that's right, yes. Yes. 13.5 percent, yes. 14 And that was disclosed in the 15 September 9th press release, right? 16 Α. Yes. 17 Do you agree that the accumulation 18 of a toe hold position of that size would 19 signal to GFI shareholders that BGC had a 20 level of commitment to the transaction? 21 I think the letter itself states 22 that, yes, or the press release and letter 23 itself state that. 24 0. Fair enough. 25 Are you familiar with the

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 208

- literature that Professor Jarrell cited in
- his reports finding the toe hold positions
- 3 cause bidders to bid more aggressively?
- A. I am aware of that literature, yes.
 - Q. Do you agree with it?
- A. I have no reason to dispute any of
- 7 what Dr. Jarrell claims that literature says
- 8 in his report.

5

- 9 Q. And you are familiar with the
- 10 research that Professor Jarrell cites finding
- 11 that toe hold positions increase the
- 12 likelihood that a merger will be consummated;
- is that right?
- Or let me put it this way: You are
- aware that Professor Jarrell cited academic
- 16 research finding that toe hold positions
- increase the likelihood that a merger will be
- 18 consummated?
- 19 A. I believe that's right, yes.
- Q. Do you have any basis to dispute
- 21 any of what Dr. Jarrell -- Professor Jarrell
- 22 claims that literature says in his report?
- A. I don't have any basis to dispute
- his description of what the literature says,
- 25 no.

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

```
1
                In your opinion, had BGC not
2
    accumulated and disclosed its 13.5 percent
    toe hold in GFI, would GFI stock price still
4
    have increased by $1.13 net of market effects
5
    on September 8th and September 9th?
6
                I don't know.
7
                It might have, right?
         Ο.
8
         Α.
                I am sorry?
9
                It's possible that it would not
         0.
10
    have, right?
11
         Α.
                Well, I think given that the offer
12
    itself separate from the toe hold was for
13
    5.25, I think certainly a substantial portion
14
    of the price movement from around 4.55 up to
15
    5.25 would have occurred whether or not they
16
    did the toe hold anyway, if not all of it. I
17
    think the toe hold may have signaled
18
    additional commitment on BGC's part and also
19
    may have conveyed a higher probability of
20
    there being a bidding war and a consummated
21
    transaction. So it may have contributed
22
    somewhat to the price movement on the 8th and
23
    9th. I think I have acknowledged that in my
24
             But even absent that fact, I think
25
    the stock price would have risen from near
```

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

```
Page 210
1
    4.55 to something close to 5.25, just based
2
    on the dollar value of the offer itself.
3
                You don't believe that GFI could
         0.
    have disclosed BGC's 13.5 percent toe hold on
4
5
    July 30th, do you?
6
         Α.
                No.
7
                You don't believe GFI could have
          Ο.
8
    disclosed BGC's 13.5 percent toe hold at any
9
    time during the class period, do you?
10
                I don't believe so, no.
         Α.
11
                MR. LYNCH: Why don't we take a
12
          five-minute break?
13
                THE VIDEOGRAPHER:
                                    Stand by,
14
         please. The time is 4:04 p.m. Going
15
          off the record.
16
                (Recess)
17
                THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Okay. We are
18
         back on the record. The time is 4:23
19
         p.m.
20
    BY MR. LYNCH:
21
                Mr. Coffman, do you have -- we were
22
    talking before the break about BGC's
23
    accumulation of a toe hold. Do you have any
24
    basis on which to conclude that GFI of any
25
    basis to disclose any ownership of BGC shares
```

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 217

```
1
    underlying assets changed at all over the
2
    course of the class period?
3
                I don't recall -- I didn't do any
          Α.
4
    of my own specific analysis, but I also don't
5
    recall reviewing any evidence that I have
6
    seen in the record to suggest that there was
7
    a fundamental change in the business over
8
    that period of time.
9
                Did you go looking at that
          Q.
10
    question?
11
          Α.
                No.
12
          Q.
                Going back to paragraph 8 of your
13
    opening report.
14
          Α.
                Okay.
15
          0.
                Let's assume that -- why don't we
16
    focus on the press release at the same time,
17
    which is the July 30th press release.
18
          Α.
                Okay.
19
                Let's assume that CME and GFI
20
    issued a press release on July 30th
21
    announcing the CME deal that was precisely
```

like this one except for the fact that it did

"Optimizing GFI's value for stockholders has

been a goal of management since becoming a

not include the sentence that reads,

22

23

24

25

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 218 1 public company in 2005, and this transaction 2 represents a singular and unique opportunity 3 to return value." What's your view -- do you believe 4 5 that had that press release excluding that 6 sentence been issued on July 30 that the 7 stock price of GFI would have increased by an 8 additional \$1.13 beyond the increase that 9 took place on that day excluding market 10 effects? 11 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 12 I don't think that's the relevant 13 question, but that's not -- I have not formed 14 a view as to what the -- if you simply remove 15 that sentence from the press release what the 16 stock price impact would have been. 17 BY MR. LYNCH: 18 Do you believe it would have been 19 different at all? To be clear, different --20 that the change in the stock price on GFI 21 would have been any different than it was 22 following the announcement of the July 30th 23 press release?

24

25

That's just not a subject that I

have formed an opinion on. I think it's

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

```
Page 224
1
    30th press release.
2
                Let's assume, then, that on
3
    July 30, 2014 defendants issued a press
    release precisely like this one except
4
5
    it did not conceal the information that you
6
    describe as having been concealed in
7
    paragraph 20, and it did not include the
8
    misstatements that you allege were made or
9
    misrepresentations that you allege were made
10
    in paragraph 20.
11
                Is it your view that the increase
12
    in the GFI stock price on that day would have
13
    been greater than it was by $1.13 excluding
14
    market effects?
15
                MR. ROTTER: Objection.
16
                I want to make sure I am
17
    interpreting your question properly. You are
18
    asking me would the increase observed on that
19
    day, July 30th, have been greater had this
20
    information that's alleged to have been
21
    omitted been incorporated into the press
22
    release and the positive statement or the
23
    alleged misleading statement was deleted from
24
    the press release, would the stock price have
25
    been greater?
```

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

```
Page 225
1
    BY MR. LYNCH:
2
                By $1.13 net of market effects,
3
    that's the question.
4
          Α.
                My opinion is that I can't claim
5
    that it instantaneously would have gone up by
6
    more than $1.13 on that day. We don't have
7
    direct evidence to estimate precisely by how
8
    much it would have gone up above $4.55 or
9
    wherever roughly it closed that day. But I
10
    do think it would have signaled to the market
11
    that there was -- there were lots more
12
    questions to be asked about the process and
13
    what BGC's interest might be.
14
                I think it would have prompted more
15
    questions by analysts to BGC itself and over
    some reasonably short period of time, maybe
16
17
    not on that day but over some reasonably
18
    short period of time, the market price would
19
    have reflected the underlying assets -- the
20
    value of the underlying assets as the market
21
    learned more about what potential deals there
22
    might have been out there.
23
                What's the reasonably short period
24
    of time that it would -- that, in your view,
25
    it would take for the increase in the GFI
```

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

```
1
    stock price to equal the $1.13 net of market
2
    effects that you have opined on in your
3
    opinion had the press release been, to use
4
    your term, corrected in the way that you
5
    think it should have been or that you
6
    interpret plaintiffs' allegations as
7
    expressing that it should have been?
8
                MR. ROTTER:
                             Objection.
9
         Α.
                Again, it's hard to say because of
10
    the misrepresentation itself, we can't
11
    observe directly how that would have played
12
    out but given that the underlying value of
13
    the assets was much higher than the 4.55 and
14
    ultimately 30 to 40 days later led to a bid
15
    of 5.25 a share, I think it's entirely
16
    reasonable to look at the value in the wake
17
    of -- the price movement in the wake of that
18
    disclosure as the most reliable economic
19
    proxy for what the market -- how the market
20
    would have valued full and complete
21
    information about the value of the assets and
22
    that through some reasonably rapid process as
23
    a result of the disclosures we are talking
24
    about would have caused the market to come to
    its own evaluation of what the value of those
25
```

FINAL - CONFIDENTIAL Chad Coffman - Sept. 27, 2017

Page 227 1 assets were that was not limited to the deal 2 price of 4.55. 3 So your question is precisely how 4 quickly would it have done that, and I am 5 saying given that we don't directly observe 6 the process I am describing taking place, I 7 don't have a clear answer for you as to what 8 -- but I would think a reasonably short 9 period of time. Days, a week. Somewhere in 10 that range. 11 BY MR. LYNCH: 12 Just so I am clear, in your view, 0. 13 within days or a week, the stock price of GFI would have risen by an additional \$1.13 net 14 15 of market effects above where it rose on July 16 30th --17 MR. ROTTER: Objection. 18 BY MR. LYNCH: 19 Q. -- is that right? Do I have that 20 right? 21 Let me put it this way. We are now 22 faced with estimating damages assuming 23 plaintiffs' allegations are correct and 24 assuming that the 4.55 reflects a substantial 25 undervaluation of the underlying assets and